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Abstract
The article aims to re-purpose evaluation to learn about social justice by anchoring evaluation 
in normative dimensions. This article demonstrates the ways in which evaluation with an 
establishment orientation can limit the scope for dialogue and neglect narratives that contest 
the status quo. It explains how a more participatory approach that engages with the standpoints 
of marginalised participants can enhance the potential to learn about social justice. An ethical 
commitment to social justice does not mean a rejection of rigour in evidence-based evaluation. 
Relating Fraser’s critical theory of participatory parity to the regulative ideal of evaluation creates 
a foundation to systematically foreground explanations about how an intervention has delivered 
social justice.
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Introduction
All evaluation approaches are in some way pedagogical, although there is variation in what 
they teach and convey (Patton, 2017). Evaluation has the potential to produce knowledge to 
learn about social justice. But reflecting on 40 years of conducting evaluations, Mathison 
(2018) concludes that evaluation has not fulfilled its potential to contribute to transformative 
social change. She identifies three reasons for this: first, the practice of evaluation is con-
strained by dominant ideologies; second, that evaluation is not independent and has become a 
service provided to those with power; and third, that evaluation is a practice that follows 
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pre-determined boundaries and so produces knowledge to support learning within the frames 
of the status quo.
Evaluation is assembled from a broad diversity of disciplines and has its own concepts, 
toolkits and epistemic communities (Picciotto, 2017); yet as Kuhn’s (1962) work on scientific 
paradigms shows, consensus in scientific research stabilises what counts as evidence in differ-
ent modes of inquiry. Evaluation that is considered to be more robust by policy-makers and 
grant-making organisations tends to be concerned with ‘what is’ and not ‘what ought to be’ 
(Stame, 2018: 440). This article will engage with critical questions about what purpose this 
serves and for whom.
The article aims to re-purpose evaluation to be able to better learn about social justice by 
anchoring evaluation theory and practice in social justice values and ideals. An engagement 
with normative commitments to social justice does not mean a rejection of rigour in evidence-
based evaluation; nor does it mean abandonment of the fundamental aim to produce causal 
explanations. An ethical commitment to social justice requires an alternative mode of social 
scientific inquiry for evaluation. Bevir and Blakely (2017) identify a ‘philosophical conflict’ 
between naturalist and anti-naturalist philosophies of social science research. The contested 
role of normative foundations in evaluation can be framed through this philosophical prism. 
Naturalism arises from a belief that the social and natural worlds are similar enough that they 
should be studied in the same way and that an ‘objective’ process of social science can be 
achieved (Bevir and Kedar, 2008). In contrast, anti-naturalism is rooted in the position that 
human agency makes social science incompatible with the methodologies of natural science 
and so demands a critical engagement with normative foundations as a key dimension of 
social research (Bevir and Blakely, 2016: 31).
This article will argue that an engagement with normative foundations can broaden the 
potential for evaluation to learn about social justice. Re-purposing evaluation requires a recon-
figured epistemological politics. Epistemological politics is the idea that certain types of 
knowledge and knowers are privileged over others. In Decolonizing Methodologies, Smith 
(2013) asks researchers to develop a ‘more critical understanding of the underlying assump-
tions, motivations and values which inform research practices’ (p. 20). As Collins (2019: 127) 
explains, social injustice can be reproduced through the application of apparently objective 
rules, and the substance of these rules can serve to perpetuate social injustice.
The implications of a reconfigured epistemological politics of evaluation are explored 
through this article, and it will be explained how a more critical participatory approach can 
enhance the capacity to learn about social justice. Fraser’s (Fraser and Honneth, 2003) critical 
theory of participatory parity is related to the regulative ideal of evaluation to reconfigure the 
epistemological politics of evaluation to be more inclusive of participants and sensitive to 
injustice. Participatory parity as a regulative ideal deliberately distributes the power to shape 
the judgements from an evaluation and ensures that the knowledge of people who experience 
injustice is valued. By doing so, concerns about social justice are foregrounded. This article 
aims to reconfigure the epistemological foundations for a re-purposed evaluation that is 
empirically informed, normatively defensible and practically orientated to assess how an 
intervention has delivered social justice. Through relating the regulative ideal of participatory 
parity to evaluation theory and practice, it is possible to realise Stame’s (2018) ambition that 
‘an evaluation should be able to perform two tasks: document discrimination and injustice; 
and highlight autonomous ways of finding solutions [to social problems] through empower-
ment, creativity and the mobilisation of hidden resources’ (p. 448).
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Picciotto (2015) demands that the time has come for the field of evaluation to adopt a more 
activist outlook: activist evaluators can challenge the status quo, promote new social policy 
approaches, and make the political dynamics behind the policies and programmes that they 
assess more visible. The approach advanced through this article contributes towards this 
movement and will be most useful for activist-scholars who can use evaluation to support 
learning about social justice.
An establishment orientation to evaluation that limits the scope 
for learning
Weiss (1993) argued that political influences mean that evaluation predominantly has an 
‘establishment orientation’, which tends to produce learning within the frames of the status 
quo. Weiss (1993: 101) identifies three political influences that result in an establishment ori-
entation: first, the agency that is responsible for designing the intervention tends to commis-
sion the evaluation and define its terms; second, the evaluator’s boundaries of investigation 
are pre-determined by the politics that shaped the original design of an intervention; and third, 
that evaluation reports are primarily produced for policy-makers rather than the public. 
Establishment-oriented forms of evaluation are based on questions of ‘what is’ and neglect 
more critical questions of ‘what ought to be’. The primary purpose of establishment-oriented 
evaluation is to produce knowledge that can be used to support technocratic policy-making. 
Mathison (2018) argues that ‘while it is entirely appropriate for evaluation practitioners to 
work in this way, it blunts our attention to big questions about why this intervention, why this 
strategy, why these people and not others?’ (p. 117).
Fischer (1993) argues that the discursive practices of dominant modes of knowledge pro-
duction, such as establishment-oriented evaluation, should not be seen as value-free construc-
tions of knowledge as they reflect values consistent with the status quo. Technocratic forms of 
policy-making are rooted in naturalist philosophies of science that reject an engagement with 
competing narrative frames (Bevir and Blakely, 2016). Establishment-oriented evaluation is 
rooted in the naturalist philosophy that aims to produce an ‘objective’ social science, con-
structed as a depoliticised practice that at the very least aims to have objectivity as ‘a regula-
tive ideal’ (Smith, 1990). The idea of objectivity as a regulative ideal is ‘about keeping the 
inner workings of science – its inferences, its data – free from value judgments’ (Scriven, 
2007: 6). Through an ambition to conduct ‘value-free’ social science, establishment-oriented 
evaluators proceed from the naturalist basis that the social world is a neutral object, upon 
which they can apply their theories as instruments of ‘discovery, description, classification, 
and explanation’ (Bevir and Kedar, 2008: 508).
But if we think about research as a purely technical process, then we ignore the significance 
of power relations in shaping research itself (Collins, 2019: 143). Critical debates in the field 
of evaluation are fundamentally about epistemological politics – ostensibly about who has the 
power to shape the knowledge that is produced (Schwandt, 2007). The epistemological frames 
that are selected by evaluators serve to construct evidence in particular ways (Learmonth and 
Harding, 2006). Evidence that is produced through establishment-oriented evaluation reflects 
discourses that are rooted in expert and technocratic objectivism (Vanderplaat, 1995: 83). 
Narratives that might contest dominant discourses through making inequalities visible are 
often neglected as they are outside the frames of investigation.
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The regulative ideal of objectivity aims to reduce the role of interpretive values in evalua-
tion (Smith, 1990). There is limited scope for dialogue with participants that might contest the 
ways in which an intervention has originally been framed, shift the boundaries of investiga-
tion, or contest dominant discourses. A rejection of the constitutive role of normative founda-
tions leads to a privileging of the position of evaluators. Evaluators are positioned as objective 
scientists who are uniquely placed to provide explanations of an intervention through a value-
free assessment of empirical data (Bevir and Kedar, 2008: 507). Through an establishment 
orientation, the evaluator is valorised as the ultimate arbiter, making judgements against crite-
ria that have often been determined by the policy-makers who designed the intervention. 
There is limited space in the process for the participants to act as subjective agents who can 
construct their own explanations to disrupt the original framing of an intervention.
The original frames of an investigation remain undisturbed through establishment-oriented 
evaluation, with too few opportunities for participants to shape the contours of the study. For 
instance, Randomised Controlled Trials (RCTs) aim to ensure that the research ‘objects’ who 
have received a particular intervention are kept ‘blind’ to the process of evaluation. Closed 
forms of research are designed by the evaluators and delivered through standardised surveys. 
These surveys produce data to test whether the intervention has met its original objectives. 
The data produced through the surveys can then be statistically analysed. A closed approach is 
taken to maintain the scientific discipline of the inquiry. The capacity to produce knowledge 
through an establishment-oriented evaluation is tightly controlled following the regulative 
ideal of objectivity. The possibilities for co-constructing judgements about an intervention 
with participants are limited.
RCTs can add diversity through delivering the studies in different locations, with different 
populations, and in different settings. However, evaluators conducting experiments still tend 
to demand a standardisation of the instruments used to test whether the original policy objec-
tives have been met. While recognising the inevitable trade-offs, Katz et al. (2011) argue that 
the tensions between participatory research methods and RCTs are not insurmountable. Katz 
et al.’s suggested method of bridging the divide is the ‘Multisite Translational Community 
Trial’. Like conventional RCTs, they insist that all sites must have standard intervention 
components, outcome measures, data capture methods and analytical approaches. Where 
Katz et al.’s approach differs from conventional RCTs is that the means of delivering the 
intervention and reaching the population of interest can be shaped by the community. Katz el 
al.’s approach still prefers ‘blinding’. It remains based on standardised outcome measures 
and analytical approaches rooted in closed forms of research. While Katz et al. think crea-
tively about how to reconfigure the epistemological approach to experimental evaluation, the 
dialogic scope of their approach remains fundamentally limited. Participants can shape how 
the intervention is delivered, but they cannot contribute their interpretations to shape the 
frames of investigation used to arrive at evaluative judgements, nor can they influence the 
final explanations.
Uncritically accepting the original framing of an intervention to make evaluative judge-
ments is a normative choice (Berk and Rossi, 1976: 339). Establishment-oriented evaluations 
use pre-determined criteria for assessment to evidence outcome judgements and tend not to 
provide a value-critique of the original aims of the intervention (Taylor, 2006). The possibili-
ties for critical assessment of the values that are internal and associated with the intervention 
remain constrained (Gates, 2018: 210). The external values that shape the construction of 
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policy ‘problems’ and ‘solutions’ are considered outside the boundaries of investigation for an 
evaluation (Silver and Crossley, 2019). The idea that the primary purpose of evaluation is to 
find out whether an intervention delivers the originally designed effect(s) is rarely contested 
(Stame, 2018: 439).
Following a naturalist approach to science, establishment-oriented evaluators privilege 
qualities of control, measurement and precision – qualities which are seen as more robust 
ways through which to produce credible evidence. Establishment-oriented evaluation has 
become ‘incorporated into managerialist philosophies and embedded in bureaucratic and 
administrative practices and standardised procedures for monitoring and performance assess-
ment’ (Schwandt, 2017: 548). The standardisation of competencies required from evaluators 
has meant that establishment-oriented evaluation has too often become a mechanistic assess-
ment into whether an intervention’s original objectives have been achieved (Dahler-Larsen, 
2012, cited in Julnes and Bustelo, 2017: 542) – and so neglect the scope for learning from 
more critical explanations that surface alternative approaches and make structural inequalities 
more visible.
Evaluation has become increasingly technocratic and based upon methodological deter-
minism that can result in a ‘tool kit approach’ to evaluation (Schwandt, 2017: 549). Through 
this process, technocratic knowledge is produced that can be used instrumentally within the 
frames of existing social policy (Knorr, 1977, cited in Daviter, 2015: 493). Technocratic 
knowledge produced through establishment-oriented evaluation is intended to contribute 
directly towards engineering changes to social ‘problems’ that have been defined by policy 
elites (Head, 2013). As noted by Cox (1996, cited in Lingard, 2013), the problem-solving 
model ‘accepts the world as it finds it, including existing power relations, inequalities, and 
oppressions, and thus accepts the status quo as the framework for action’ (p. 120).
Transformation away from the status quo is required in a world that is characterised by 
increasing social and economic inequality, far-right nationalism, and ecological catastrophe.
We must ask the following question: how can evaluation produce robust knowledge that 
can contribute towards a more socially just world?
A reluctance to engage with normative foundations through evaluation leads to a closure of 
possibilities for learning from competing narratives that can challenge the status quo. Harding 
(1991: 10–11) demonstrates that ‘science is politics by other means’, explaining how scien-
tific knowledge is always ‘socially situated’, and that knowledge production can never be 
‘impartial, disinterested, or value neutral’. Assessing pre-determined criteria should not pre-
clude an openness to critical engagement with ‘the unexpected, hidden rationalities and emer-
gent or new values’ (Stame, 2018: 447). By restricting inquiry within investigative frames that 
have been pre-determined (and which usually reflect the values of the status quo), the scope 
for producing knowledge about social justice beyond these frames is limited.
Drawing on Foucault’s notion of disciplinary power, Chouinard (2013) argues that the 
adherence of establishment-oriented evaluation to dominant discourses and standards can be 
conceptualised as ‘technologies of control’. She identifies how technocratic notions of 
accountability have become separated from the democratic principle of pluralism and the 
existence of competing normative frames. By limiting the scope for multiple explanations, 
establishment-oriented evaluation is rarely used to develop new political imaginations that 
consider alternative approaches to political economy or different types of social protection 
(Reddy, 2012: 62).
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Vanderplaat (1995: 86) argues that the establishment orientation of evaluation produces 
knowledge that limits the types of questions that can be explored; she explains how estab-
lishment-oriented evaluators position themselves as ‘disinterested and apolitical inform-
ants’, and as such they do not address questions of ‘what ought to be’, rejecting the 
possibilities of producing knowledge for social justice beyond dominant discourses and 
frames of social policy. An alternative approach is needed that opens up evaluation pro-
cesses to more systematically engage with narratives that contest unequal relations of power. 
The following section engages with ideas that have challenged the establishment orientation 
of evaluation and builds on these as the foundations for a new form of counter-establish-
ment evaluation that deliberately foregrounds an ethical commitment to social justice.
A counter-establishment orientation to learn about social justice
As critical theorists of evaluation have concluded, evaluation is not value-free, and so norma-
tive foundations should be directly engaged with (Guba and Lincoln, 1989; Mertens and 
Wilson, 2012; Schwandt, 2007; Weiss, 1979). Evaluation involves making a value-judgement 
through determining the merit or worth of an intervention (Scriven, 1991). Judgements on the 
value of merit are based on intrinsic concerns, which are informed through an investigation 
into whether an intervention has been delivered effectively (Alkin and King, 2016: 570). 
Judgements on the value of worth, on the contrary, ultimately involve making ethical deci-
sions. Making judgements based on normative assessment is therefore an inevitable dimen-
sion of evaluative inquiry, and so all evaluators should make their normative foundations 
explicit (Greene, 1997).
Making judgements in evaluation through normative assessment remains deeply controver-
sial. Greene (1997: 26) explains that ‘the notion of evaluation as advocacy still rings as exqui-
site heresy to many ears’. Becker (1967) maintained that it is not possible to do research 
without normative dimensions. The question for Becker is not whether we should take sides, 
since we inevitably will, but rather whose side we are on. Warren and Garthwaite (2015) 
explain that Becker was ultimately asking ‘whether social research and the individuals engaged 
in it were part of the established order or could contribute to the emerging counterculture’ (p. 
225). Becker (1967) recognised how research with a counter-establishment orientation is often 
dismissed by people in positions of authority or those who have a high status that has been 
achieved through producing establishment-oriented research:
. . . we provoke the charge of bias . . . by refusing to give credence and deference to an established 
status order, in which knowledge of truth and the right to be heard are not equally distributed . . . By 
refusing to accept the hierarchy of credibility, we express disrespect for the entire established order. 
We compound our sin and further provoke charges of bias by not giving immediate attention and 
‘equal time’ to the . . . explanations of official authority. (pp. 241–242)
Becker demonstrated that accusations of bias against counter-establishment research can 
often be unfounded and disproportionate. Exploring ‘what ought to be’ should not preclude a 
robust investigation into ‘what is’. Evaluation with a counter-establishment orientation can 
still systematically investigate the design, implementation and effectiveness of an interven-
tion, while also producing knowledge rooted in an ethical commitment to produce knowledge 
to learn about social justice. Greene (1997) argues that bringing normative commitments into 
evaluation does not compromise the process, so long as the evaluator does not take a ‘partisan 
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stance toward a particular program’ (pp. 28–29). A counter-establishment evaluation must still 
determine the merit of an intervention. Evaluators with an ethical commitment to social justice 
still need to systematically find out how effective an intervention has been and the extent to 
which it has delivered outcomes that promote social justice.
Normative dimensions are not segregated from empirical research through an anti-natural-
ist philosophy of science, and competing narratives are used to generate more robust explana-
tions. Instead of a single ‘official’ scientific account, multiple narratives can better reflect the 
realities of the social world (Bevir and Blakely, 2016: 42). Anti-naturalist researchers do not 
privilege a particular explanation and all accounts can be contested (Bevir and Blakely, 2016: 
41). Engaging with different narratives through dialogue is an important dimension of social 
inquiry as a way to explain contingency, human agency and situated practices that help 
researchers make sense of the world and provide valid explanations based on evidence (Bevir 
and Blakely, 2017; Bevir and Kedar, 2008).
Causation does not need to follow the science of prediction that is dominant in establish-
ment-oriented forms of evaluation (Silver and Crossley, 2019). The causal logic for anti-natu-
ralist evaluation is one of explanation. Instead of aiming to find predictive laws, 
counter-establishment evaluation can focus upon generating theories to produce causal expla-
nations. The basis of explaining a causal relationship changes from an ‘effects-of-causes-
stance’ (a what works question) which is typical for establishment evaluations, to ‘a 
causes-of-effects-stance’ (why does it work or did it not work?) (Pattyn et al., 2017: 7). 
Counter-establishment evaluators working from an anti-naturalist foundation can co-construct 
causal explanations as partners in dialogue with participants (Bevir and Blakely, 2017: 14).
A counter-establishment evaluation rooted in an anti-naturalist philosophy of science does 
not view research methods as a set of ‘mechanical procedures’ that can be applied to discover 
an objective truth, but rather as a rigorous means through which to understand an intervention 
(Sanderson, 2000). Pluralism, devolution of expertise and dialogue with participants are cen-
tral to anti-naturalist social science (Bevir and Blakely, 2017: 13), representing an ‘epistemic 
commitment to dialogical engagement’ (Collins, 2019: 144). The practice of evaluation should 
be seen as a ‘relational public craft’ (Schwandt, 2017: 551), through which the evaluator’s role 
is to enable ‘assisted sense-making’ (Mark et al., 2000, cited in Dahler-Larsen, 2013: 156). A 
counter-establishment form of evaluation can develop this relational public craft by cultivat-
ing the sociological imagination, defined by Mills (1959) as
. . . the capacity to shift from one perspective to another. It is this imagination . . . that sets off the 
social scientist from the . . . technician. Adequate technicians can be trained in a few years. The 
sociological imagination can also be cultivated . . . Yet there is an unexpected quality about it, 
perhaps because its essence is the combination of ideas that no one expected were combinable . . . 
There is a playfulness of mind back of such combining as well as a truly fierce drive to make sense 
of the world . . . Perhaps [the technician] is too well trained, too precisely trained. Since one can be 
trained only in what is already known, training sometimes incapacitates one from learning new ways 
. . . (p. 211)
Mills articulates a vision of research as a craft, which is open to multiple perspectives and 
embraces the unpredictable. Developing the sociological imagination opens up the potential 
to connect everyday problems with public issues. Counter-establishment evaluation as a craft 
of ‘assisted sense-making’ involves working alongside participants in the search for explana-
tions of an intervention that might not have been predicted. Narratives of explanation that 
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might sit outside pre-determined boundaries can be critically engaged with. As the scope of 
evaluation is not restricted within pre-determined boundaries of investigation, there are more 
possibilities to generate learning about social justice beyond dominant discourses and frames 
of social policy.
Promoting the inclusion of research participants to be able to co-construct explanations 
through dialogue does not dismiss the knowledge of policy-makers or evaluators. Rather, it is 
a demand to abandon the idea of a ‘privileged position’ in determining the final evaluative 
judgements about an intervention (Vanderplaat, 1995: 91). Multiple ways of seeing and know-
ing can enable an epistemic advantage to enrich an evaluation study (Greene and Caracelli, 
1997). As Fine (2011) reasons, ‘knowledge of injustice is widely distributed even if legitimacy 
is not’ (p. 14). Feminist standpoint epistemologies identify a particular promise for learning 
about social justice from the views of marginalised groups. These theories are based on the 
conviction that people who have direct experience of struggling against social injustice on a 
daily basis produce unique insights. Forms of daily resistance against injustice have often 
secured better conditions and delivered social justice more effectively than formal political 
institutions (Harding, 1991: 130). A commitment to social justice demands systematic engage-
ment with the standpoints of participants who experience social injustice. When aiming to 
develop an evaluation approach to learn about social justice, it is therefore crucial to value the 
experiential knowledge of marginalised communities.
The traditions of participatory evaluation are based on the inclusion of marginalised 
communities to promote social justice. Participatory evaluation is based on collaboration 
between evaluators and community members (Chouinard and Cousins, 2015: 6). Participatory 
evaluation has been put forward as an approach that can overcome the problems with tech-
nocratic evaluation (Smits and Champagne, 2008). Participants have control at each stage 
of the evaluation process (Cousins and Chouinard, 2012; Cousins and Whitmore, 1998). 
There are three main dimensions of participatory evaluation, along which the depth and 
range of participation lies: first, the degrees of control over technical decisions of the evalu-
ation processes and conduct; second, the selection of the types of stakeholders who partici-
pate; and third, the participation that happens through different stages of the research process 
(Cousins and Whitmore, 1998: 9). Participants can shape the ways that an investigation 
unfolds through an evaluation.
There are two models of participatory evaluation (Cousins and Whitmore, 1998: 6). The 
first is practical participatory evaluation, which is more instrumental and aims to support pro-
gramme decision-making. The second model is transformative participatory evaluation, which 
aims to empower marginalised communities through a process of radical education. The trans-
formative model of participatory evaluation is based on the theories of Paolo Freire and the 
work of the Highlander Research and Education Center (Gaventa, 1988). Freire (1970) empha-
sises the importance of dialogue to develop critical analysis of social action through reflection 
on practice, supporting participants to situate their everyday problems in social, historical and 
political contexts. Patton (2017: 69) identifies four ways that evaluation based on radical 
pedagogy can support learning about social justice: first, the definition of a problem that is 
being evaluated can be reconsidered; second, dominant assumptions can be exposed through 
experiential knowledge; third, alternative explanations about an intervention can be put for-
ward; and finally, strategic points of social change can be identified through discussion.
More epistemologically open forms of evaluation that engages with participants’ narratives 
can generate new explanations and provide critical insights into social justice. Engaging with 
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narratives does not mean we abandon systematic social research. Haraway (1988) identifies a 
danger of romanticising the standpoints of the most marginalised. Privileging particular stand-
points can leave them unaccountable, critically unexamined and at risk of relativism. Instead 
of romanticising the standpoints of marginalised communities, Haraway (1988: 584) argues 
that scientists should aim for ‘passionate detachment’ and seek to locate these standpoints 
within broader frames of knowledge.
Haraway’s idea of situated knowledges is intended as a scientific approach against both 
subjective relativism and objective universalism. Haraway makes the case that subjective nar-
ratives must be accountable to the objective conditions in which they are situated. One way to 
make standpoints more accountable is to engage in dialogue. While it is important to remain 
sensitive about how to proceed with these discussions (Patrick, 2020: 17), dialogue between 
evaluators and participants can produce knowledge that is made more accountable by situating 
particular experiences of injustice in critical theories of social science.
The judgement of quality in research should take account of the epistemological founda-
tions from which it is built (Fossey et al., 2002). The rigour of an evaluation can be ensured 
by validity measures and the inclusion of different cases through empirical investigation. 
Lincoln and Guba (1985: 314) describe member checking as ‘the most crucial technique for 
establishing credibility’. Member-checking distributes validity procedures between researcher 
and participants (Creswell and Miller, 2000). To achieve a valid foundation for evaluation, 
different experiences of an intervention must be critically examined. Heterogeneity therefore 
becomes a source of knowledge and validity.
Critical participatory research that engages with narratives and foregrounds social justice 
can strengthen the construct validity of an evaluation by enabling the people most adversely 
affected by social policy to re-shape the frames of inquiry (Sandwick et al., 2018: 479–480). 
Changing Minds (Fine et al., 2001) was a participatory evaluation conducted by women in 
prison and from outside. The evaluation was instigated after federal funding had been cut 
when President Clinton made incarcerated people ineligible for Pell grants in the 1990s. This 
policy resulted in a reduction in college programmes in prison from 350 programmes in 1994 
to just 8 in 1995. The aim of the evaluation was to ‘generate science that would influence state 
and national policy on college and prison’ (Fine, 2019: 85) A research collective was created 
that included women ‘inside’ at Bedford Hills Correctional Facility and women from ‘outside’ 
at City University New York. These women had different insights rooted in their diverse 
experiences:
Some were involved in grassroots advocacy; some were mothers; some spoke Spanish as their first 
language; some were raised in poverty, some with wealth; some had confronted serious health 
issues; some held multiple degrees, some had just begun college while in prison. (Sandwick et al., 
2018: 480)
The women who were in prison made the case that the evaluation should investigate the 
ways in which the college at Bedford Hills affected many other interactions – for instance, 
discipline, children’s education and interactions on cell blocks and in the yard. Sandwick et al. 
(2018) report that through an enhanced understanding of the construct ‘college in prison’, the 
research collective expanded the investigative frames of the evaluation (p. 480). The frames 
of investigation were broadened to include evidence not only about reductions in recidivism 
(and associated cost savings), but also changes in prison culture and the effects on the families 
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of the women in prison. By including the critical insights of the women in prison, the frames 
of investigation were broadened and the validity of the evaluation was strengthened. The 
evaluation documented the causes of structural injustice and evidenced the impacts from a 
solution that was at hand. The researchers produced a robust critique of the political economy 
of racialised capitalism and patriarchy, and identified the impacts of an intervention to disrupt 
these inequalities.
Evaluation creates a rare opportunity for marginalised groups to influence public delibera-
tion (Vestman and Conner, 2013). Advocating the position that evaluation should meaning-
fully engage with the standpoints of people who are the most marginalised does not mean 
other viewpoints are excluded (Greene, 1997). To do so would invite legitimate questions 
concerning the validity of an evaluation. More democratic processes of evaluation can avoid 
accusations of bias through an alternative conception of objectivity.
In order to reconfigure the regulative ideal of objectivity to broaden the scope for dialogue, 
democratically oriented approaches to evaluation have advanced the regulative ideal of demo-
cratic pluralism (Greene, 1997). Democratic pluralism as a regulative ideal is designed to 
make sure that an evaluation provides a balanced and complete view. Marginalised partici-
pants are actively sought out and supported to engage in an evaluation, but their explanations 
of an intervention do not produce an exclusive evidence-base for judgement. Triangulation of 
data through a mixed-methods approach that includes a full range of perspectives from all 
stakeholders can help achieve a valid evaluation (Mertens, 1999). Through a more democratic 
regulative ideal for evaluation, the absolute authority of the evaluator to make judgements 
about a programme becomes more distributed and balanced. The judgement of an intervention 
is shaped through a collective process of explanation. These judgements are fair and unbiased, 
not because they are impartial, but because they are multi-interested (Greene, 1997: 33).
A regulative ideal of democratic pluralism can provide an alternative conceptualisation of 
rigour for evaluation, while enhancing the potential to learn about social justice. As explana-
tions of an intervention are co-constructed with participants, evidence and outcomes can be 
contested (Arensman and Van Wessel, 2018). As different narratives are potentially valid, an 
evaluation must draw on evidence to construct an explanation and demonstrate why it is pref-
erable to others. Normative foundations can provide guidance through which to inform how 
this might be done. Critical theorists of evaluation do not share a consensus about the particu-
lar social and political values that should influence evaluation (Gates, 2018: 209). The follow-
ing section sets out a new regulative ideal for evaluation based on an ethical commitment to 
social justice by bringing Fraser’s critical theory of participatory parity together with the regu-
lative ideal of democratic pluralism. Participatory parity as a regulative ideal can contribute to 
evaluation theory and practice by providing a common foundation for systematic research into 
social justice.
‘Participatory parity’ as a regulative ideal for evaluation
All evaluations are ‘bounded’ through the selection of certain criteria of performance. These 
boundaries define the frames of investigation that will take place. Boundaries are established 
according to what evidence is considered necessary to judge an intervention. Choices must be 
made to determine the boundaries that frame the investigation. The boundaries for establish-
ment-oriented forms of evaluation are often pre-determined by commissioners and followed 
by evaluators (Picciotto and Donaldson, 2016: 72). But neither commissioners nor evaluators 
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have an ‘in-principle advantage’ in determining the criteria for judgement (Ulrich, 2000: 8). 
Instead, we can collectively create boundaries through deliberation between competing narra-
tive claims about facts and values, in which critical decisions on the value of worth of an 
intervention are not made by the evaluator alone, but rather through a participatory process 
that the evaluator facilitates (Schwandt, 2018: 133).
Ulrich and Reynolds (2010) present boundary critique as a ‘participatory process of unfold-
ing and questioning boundary judgements rather than as an expert-driven process of boundary 
setting’. Co-constructing the boundaries of an evaluation with participants can situate the 
criteria for assessment in how an intervention has created outcomes for participants in the 
context of their particular experiences of injustice. Through the collective reconstruction of 
boundaries to frame an investigation, evaluation becomes a ‘collective undertaking rooted in 
social interaction and negotiation’ that is situated in the local contexts in which an intervention 
takes place (Schwandt, 2018: 131).
The regulative ideal of objectivity results in the boundaries for judgement reflecting the 
ways in which an intervention has been originally framed – which privileges the often pre-
determined analytical explanations of the agency responsible for designing the intervention, 
rather than the people who have experienced it. Narratives grounded in experience that might 
contest the original framing of an intervention or highlight structural inequalities can be 
neglected within establishment-oriented evaluations. As a result, the potential to document 
social injustice and learn about alternative approaches that can deliver social justice is limited.
Deliberative democratic evaluation is based on the regulative ideal of pluralism and is 
designed to ensure that evaluation provides a balanced and complete view, as the perspectives 
from all stakeholders are included. The evaluator must reflect the results of deliberation 
through analysing competing values as well as facts, representing all stakeholders’ views and 
ensuring that the necessary steps of deliberation have been taken to arrive at findings (House 
and Howe, 2000). It is through ensuring fair access to deliberation to reach evaluative conclu-
sions that deliberative democratic evaluation advances a normative foundation of justice 
(House and Howe, 2000). Within the model of deliberative democratic evaluation, the final 
judgements about value on the merit or worth of an intervention are made by the evaluator. 
The justification of the evaluator’s position as final judge is rooted in ideas of procedural jus-
tice, which demands that all voices have a fair hearing and are involved, but that the perspec-
tive of less powerful voices are not necessarily advocated for (Vestman and Conner, 2013). 
Such a purely procedural view of pluralism limits normative concerns to inclusion in the 
process of evaluation. But critical deliberative democratic scholars have demonstrated that 
unequal relations of power shape what is considered to be a better form of argument, and so 
inclusion in debates is not sufficient to promote equality (Benhabib, 1992; Sanders, 1997). 
Participatory parity as a regulative ideal provides the foundations to be able to push the nor-
mative dimensions of democratic evaluation further by systematically distributing power to 
participants who experience injustice to shape the boundaries of investigation and foreground 
concerns about social justice.
Relating Fraser’s norm of participatory parity to evaluation as a regulative ideal deepens 
the normative foundations of deliberative democratic approaches. Participatory parity brings 
together moral philosophy, social theory and critical analysis of the political economy to pro-
vide a democratic epistemology that is normatively and practically defensible (Fraser and 
Honneth, 2003: 4). Relating participatory parity to the regulative ideal of evaluation grounds 
the process in a theoretically robust foundation of social justice.
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Participatory parity is a two-dimensional normative theory of justice that considers both 
intersubjective and objective conditions that undermine equal participation in society. Fraser 
(Fraser and Honneth, 2003) draws together a two-dimensional theory of justice that accom-
modates defensible claims for recognition and redistribution. Fraser identifies intersubjec-
tive ‘misrecognition’ as cultural and symbolic injustice that is rooted in social patterns of 
disrespect including stigmatisation in public cultural representations and daily life; cultural 
domination where patterns of communication associated with another culture are con-
structed as alien or hostile; and non-recognition in which people are rendered invisible 
through representative, communicative and interpretative practices. Objective conditions of 
injustice are identified as being rooted in the systemic social and economic inequalities (re)
produced by the dominant political economy (Fraser and Honneth, 2003: 7). While mis-
recognition and distributive injustices are separate, both are ‘primary and co-original’ 
(Fraser and Honneth, 2003: 18). Neither claims hold more weight than the other, and people 
can experience injustice based on an intersection of both. For instance, redressing gender 
injustice requires an attendance to both the unequal cultural status of women and the eco-
nomic dimensions of inequality that effect women. The relationships and intersections 
between injustices are situated within their particular conditions, which must be empirically 
studied (Collins, 2019: 40). If participatory parity is achieved, all people have equal access 
to participate in social life as objective and intersubjective conditions of injustice have been 
addressed.
Participatory parity creates a normative standard through which to make judgements about 
how an intervention has responded to objective and intersubjective conditions of injustice (or 
the ways in which it has failed to). By using the normative standard of participatory parity, it 
is possible to evaluate the extent to which an intervention has fostered participatory parity or 
undermined it. In order to be able to make such a judgement, evaluators must engage in dia-
logue with participants to determine how social injustice affects their capacity to participate 
fully in social life. The experiential knowledge of participants should be contextualised in 
relation to their objective location in the social world. As such, evaluators should have knowl-
edge of critical theories to be able to situate the everyday struggles of participants in broader 
systems of injustice.
Boundaries of investigation can be co-constructed with the participants through a critical 
engagement to broaden the frames of investigation. Once the particular problems of partici-
pants have been identified, it is then possible to collectively evaluate the extent to which an 
intervention has provided a remedy to these forms of injustice. Co-constructing the bounda-
ries of an evaluation with participants can situate the criteria for assessment in particular 
contexts of social injustice. The capacity for evaluation to learn about social justice is enhanced, 
and it is rooted in a theoretical foundation that can ensure different dimensions of injustice 
have been meaningfully engaged with.
Participatory parity can guide deliberation in evaluation to make inequalities visible and 
assess social justice. Using participatory parity as a regulative ideal enables a more critical 
participatory epistemology, which enhances the sensitivity of evaluation to particular experi-
ences of injustice. Based on an assessment of how objective and subjective conditions for 
justice have been fostered, narratives that can explain how participatory parity has been 
achieved (or not) can be reasonably considered to be more defensible when assessing compet-
ing claims. A more radically inclusive interpretation of pluralism can be achieved – pushing 
the traditions of democratic evaluation forward.
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A normative commitment to social justice must remain ‘critical and open-ended’ (Collins, 
2019: 284). Participatory parity as a regulative ideal does not mean other viewpoints are 
excluded. Conclusions are not foreclosed, nor any groups excluded from the process of 
explanation. No given view is indefeasible, and no explanation is infallible (Fraser and 
Honneth, 2003: 44). To do so would legitimately invite questions concerning the validity of 
an evaluation.
Through a counter-establishment, evaluation judgements are collectively determined 
through dialogue in the evaluation process. As such, participatory parity can be used as a regu-
lative ideal to assess the relative justice claims of competing narratives. As Fraser (Fraser and 
Honneth, 2003: 42) explains, there is not an ‘algorithmic metric or method’ to determine how 
participatory parity has been fostered; rather, through discussion and argumentation, ‘conflict-
ing judgements are sifted and rival interpretations are weighed’ against the normative standard 
of participatory parity. The validity of the evaluation process is strengthened as a result of 
using participatory parity as a regulative ideal. Using participatory parity as a regulative ideal 
for evaluation provides guidelines through which to re-draw the boundaries of investigation 
so that narratives usually marginalised are instead promoted, and concerns for social justice 
become foregrounded when judgements are made. Through a regulative ideal of participatory 
parity, an intervention is put through a robust form of questioning concerning the extent to 
which it has addressed the participants’ particular experiences of social injustice. Following 
feminist standpoint theories that highlight the value of experiential knowledge to contribute 
understanding about social (in)justice, assessments produced through an evaluation using par-
ticipatory parity as a regulative ideal can enhance learning about social justice. Participatory 
parity as a regulative ideal enables evaluators to ensure that this process is transparent, valid 
and systematic.
To illustrate how the regulative ideal of participatory parity can work in practice, we can 
look at an evaluation of an intervention designed to address food insecurity among vulnerable 
groups; food insecurity was defined as not always having the economic, social and physical 
resources to ensure a sufficient supply of nutritionally appropriate food (Purdam and Silver, 
2020). The intervention was based around a series of cooking classes for people living in food 
insecurity. The intervention had received local government funding based on the idea that 
through improved cooking, people would eat healthier food and would therefore be more 
‘resilient’ to food insecurity – predicated on a theory of behavioural change. The evaluation 
had initially been designed to evidence outcomes in terms of improved cooking skills. 
Following an establishment orientation to evaluation, these initial frames would determine the 
boundaries of judgement. While the evaluation did investigate these lines of inquiry, it also 
remained open to alternative explanations.
Through an embedded approach to evaluation grounded in dialogue with participants, the 
research identified that the primary cause of participants not eating healthily was due to mate-
rial conditions such as low budgets or lack of cooking facilities, rather than a deficit of cooking 
skills (as the intervention had been originally framed). The boundaries of judgement were 
shifted by narratives that unfolded through the evaluation and contested the original framing. 
These narratives were situated within broader frames of knowledge. Participatory parity as a 
regulative ideal provided a systematic basis for determining the merits of each claim. Critical 
theories of political economy were drawn upon that located the root causes of food poverty in 
welfare reforms (objective injustice), together with research (Garthwaite, 2016) that situates 
the aim to improve cooking skills of people living in food insecurity as a response rooted in 
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stigmatisation (subjective injustice). Through a more open approach to evaluation, the impor-
tance of providing material support for people (through the direct provision of healthy food 
ingredients and material items, such as ovens) was identified as a key outcome to deliver social 
justice in regard to food insecurity. In addition, the ways in which the intervention provided 
non-judgemental support for participants in response to stigmatisation were included. As these 
explanations reflected measures to address participatory parity, they were prioritised as being 
more pertinent than the original framing of increasing cooking skills. Using the regulative ideal 
of participatory parity, these claims held more weight than explanations that privileged the 
initial anticipated causal relationship between improved cooking skills and healthy eating.
The boundaries of judgement for the evaluation were shifted to consider how the inter-
vention was able to respond to objective and subjective inequalities. Evidence was still 
presented on the original objectives, but new evidence was needed to assess how the inter-
vention was responding to the participants’ particular experiences of injustice. As a result, 
the evaluation process demanded further engagement in the field to collect data on how the 
intervention was providing material support for participants, and the extent to which the 
intervention was non-judgemental and did not cause stigma. New explanations were pro-
duced which documented a broader set of outcomes that responded to the particular injus-
tices experienced by participants.
The evaluation documented discrimination and injustice by evidencing causes of social 
injustice through welfare reforms and stigmatisation of people living in food insecurity; it 
was able to highlight local solutions to social problems through the mobilisation of commu-
nity resources and creation of a supportive and non-stigmatising space for participants. 
Participatory parity provided a robust mechanism through which to interrogate the original 
framing of the intervention and guide further investigation into how the intervention was 
responding to participants’ particular experiences of injustice. The evaluation surfaced 
knowledge about an alternative approach to addressing food insecurity and produced evi-
dence about the structural causes of injustice that require remedy beyond the scope of the 
intervention. Through using participatory parity as a regulative ideal, the purpose of evalua-
tion can be broadened to contribute towards what Weis and Fine (2012) identify as a ‘dual 
lens of critical bifocality’, which documents the structural causes of social injustice and 
highlights resistance to these inequalities.
Conclusion
This article has argued that an engagement with normative foundations broadens the potential 
for evaluation to produce knowledge about social justice. Relating Fraser’s critical theory of 
participatory parity to the regulative ideal of evaluation provides a framework to ensure that 
problems of social inequality are foregrounded in evaluation – within which critical theories 
can be drawn on to situate these within broader structures of social injustice. Through a recon-
figured epistemological politics that is more radically pluralist, evaluation can comprehen-
sively document particular experiences of injustice and evidence the ways in which an 
intervention has responded to these (as well as the structural conditions that require further 
changes beyond the intervention site).
The approach advanced through this article to re-purpose evaluation to learn about social 
justice is not accompanied by a toolkit of methods or techniques – an extensive range of 
methods already exist that are consistent with the counter-establishment demand to surface 
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multiple narratives. Nor does it mean we abandon methods associated with a naturalist phi-
losophy of research as the pluralist dimensions of counter-establishment evaluation can be 
strengthened by treating these methods as one source of knowledge to be assessed within 
broader contexts and narrative positions (Byrne, 2002). Rather, it is a call to reflect on how 
we approach research in a more open and ethical way. In the Art of Listening, Back (2007) 
invites us to ‘pay attention to the fragments, the voices, and the stories that are otherwise 
passed over or ignored [and to] admit these voices and pay them the courtesy of serious atten-
tion’. Participatory parity provides a guide for a reconfigured epistemological politics of 
evaluation to enable us to fulfil this courtesy. By doing so, we can bring in new frames of 
understanding to enhance the capacity to learn about social justice. Exploring ‘what ought to 
be’ should not preclude a robust investigation into ‘what is’. Participatory parity as a regula-
tive ideal can enhance rigour in evidence-based evaluation while anchoring the process in an 
ethical commitment to social justice.
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